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?
On the tradition of economic policy in modern Britain,there exists an influential thesis that the tide
 
of international or cosmopolitan policy driven by financial interests competed with another tide of
 
national and imperial policy driven by industrial and agricultural interests. According to this thesis,
the high light of the battle between those two policies came with the Tariff Reform controversy caused
 
by Joseph Chamberlain in the Edwardian age and as a result the internationalist camp (the free
 
traders)was victorious over the imperialist and nationalist camp (the tariff reformers). This thesis
 
was pioneeringly advocated by Bernard Semmel and thereafter its basic essence has been supported
 
by many scholars and recently refined by Peter Cain and Anthony Hopkins as the theory of the
 
gentlemanly capitalism?.
Admittedly the simple binarity of this thesis has been criticized by Anthony Howe, Martin
 
Daunton or Andrew Marrison,so it is exaggeration to say that this thesis has been unchallenged until
 
now.? Especially Howe recently presented a strong argument against the idea of the City’s domi-
nance in the Edwardian age.? Therefore it might be possible to say that there does not exist a
 
complete consensus at least about the view that the City financiers or the gentlemanly capitalists
 
exerted monopolistic influence upon the making of economic policy.
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Nevertheless there is a consensus concerning the view that not the Liberal free traders but the
 
Conservative tariff reformers earnestly urged resurrection of industry. In that sense,even if the above
 
thesis has not been irrefutable,the essence of it has still a dominant influence.
In this paper,I do not necessarily aim to upset the foundation of that thesis completely. Instead
 
I will suggest a rather new perspective indicating the existence of a paradoxical twist. That is to say,
through turning attention to successive phase between the Edwardian age and the inter-war years,I
 
will demonstrate that generally the Liberal free traders continued to support the industrial interests
 
far more fervently than the Conservative tariff reformers, and that the industrial elements were
 
consistently marginalised by the Conservative policymakers.
?
There has already been much accumulation of studies about the origin and the characteristics of the
 
Tariff Reform movement. Although,as Cain or Ewen Green describe,the movement was a‘multi-
faceted’one,?it is indisputable that one element of that movement was industrial protectionism which
 
tried to resurrect Britain’s industrial power. This strategy of industrial protectionism aimed to build
 
producers’alliance between industrial capitalists and industrial labourers. This producers’alliance
 
was expected to be forged through high prices under protective tariffs. That is to say,high prices
 
promised high profits to capitalists and high wages to labourers. Thus, as long as industrial
 
protectionism presupposed high prices, the core industries which were expected to support it were
 
home market oriented industries primarily concentrated in the Midlands. As a result Chamberlain’
s movement was often identified with expression of interests of Birmingham,and it was not ground-
less,even if it could not explain all aspects of the movement that was multi-faceted.
But this industrial aspect of the movement contradicted the other aspects of the movement in some
 
points. First,the imperial element of the movement turned out to be a blockade to realisation of the
 
industrial protectionism. In the Tariff Reform programme the protective tariffs for industry were
 
always accompanied by imperial preference which required agricultural tariffs or the‘food taxes’,at
 
least until 1913. As expected from the beginning,the pledge of agricultural tariffs functioned as the
 
most burdensome obstruction to gain support for Tariff Reform in the General Elections. Therefore,
as long as the Conservatives set their priority in winning the General Elections, their pledge of
 
imperial preference should have been given up as soon as possible. Nevertheless the Conservatives
 
adhered to the food taxes till 1913 despite three consecutive losses in General Elections.
In those days Britain’s agricultural population had already decreased to around 10％,which was
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 an abnormally low figure in comparison with other industrial countries.? Accordingly,in contrast
 
to other countries,British protectionists could not rely on support of the agricultural population.
Although this fact has not received much attention,the exceptionally low population in agriculture
 
was undoubtedly one of the main factors that contributed to the exceptional strength of free traders
 
in Britain. Therefore the Conservatives’adherence to agricultural tariffs implied that they prioritised
 
imperialism over industrial protectionism. In fact Richard Jay indicates that Joseph Chamberlain’s
 
main concern in his later days was an imperial matter rather than an industrial matter.? In 1913,
Andrew Bonar Law also stated:‘I have looked back some of my old speeches on this subject,and
 
I find that I have always said that the Food Duties were not proposed by us for the sake of Protection,
but solely for the sake of Preference;and obviously if they are not necessary for Preference then they
 
would not be imposed. This is not only the view which I have always advocated,but so far as I can
 
remember it was the view invariably taken by Mr.Chamberlain himself.’?
Second,advocacy of industrial protectionism contradicted the character of the Conservatives to
 
a great degree. According to several studies,the difference in economic interests between the two
 
major parties became clearer from 1886. While within the Conservatives landed and financial
 
interests were still dominant,for the Liberals industrial interests became dominant.? According to Y.
Cassis,mainstream City financiers tended to favour the Conservatives, or the Unionists.? As for
 
industry, interests of heavy industries such as the steel industry tended to be included in the
 
Conservatives,while interests of light industries such as the textile industry tended to be included in
 
the Liberals.?? Of course we should beware of simple classification,but it is not senseless to discern
 
a general tendency.
Recognising this general tendency,one can say that the Tariff Reform movement had a serious
 
contradiction from the beginning. As far as the interests of Birmingham (heavy industries) were
 
nationalistic in demanding domestic protection, inevitably they could not help falling foul of the
 
financial interests that were fundamentally cosmopolitan. That is to say,the original coexistence of
 
the City with Birmingham in the Conservatives had a serious contradiction.
On the surface this contradiction was resolved by 1909,when the tariff reformers succeeded in
 
uniting the Conservatives under their programme. But it is simplistic to interpret it as a victory of
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 the industrial element in the Conservatives. In fact,as Cain and Hopkins argue,the disagreement
 
between the nationalistic elements (Birmingham) and the cosmopolitan elements (the City) was
 
overcome,not through the victory of Birmingham,but through the emergence of an agreement on the
 
desirability for indirect taxes.?? That is to say, the financial and social policies of the Liberal
 
Government had directly threatened gentlemanly elites through an increase in direct taxes mainly
 
targeted at unearned income,with the result that gentlemanly elites including a majority of City
 
financiers converted to Tariff Reform. Therefore the contradictory alliance between Birmingham and
 
the City continued as well after 1909.
As for the abandonment of imperial preference in 1913, it is possible to suggest two different
 
hypotheses. On the one hand,one can say that it implied‘embourgeoiment’of the Conservatives.??
According to this view, under the new leader Bonar Law,who had been an iron merchant, the
 
Conservatives became more identified as a party of middle class through forsaking landed interests,
one part of gentlemanly elites. On the other hand,one can also say that it implied rather the victory
 
of mainstream gentlemanly elites(financial interests)over the die-hard tariff reformers.??Conforming
 
to this view,the former decided to prioritise the purpose of winning elections over the imperial ideal
 
held by the latter. Accordingly,the forsaking of landed interests meant that relative density within
 
gentlemanly elites had inclined decisively towards financial interests as a consequence of a sharp
 
increase in disposition of lands since 1910.
Of these two hypotheses,the latter one is far more persuasive. For example,in 1912 in his diary
 
Austen Chamberlain referred to Lord Lansdowne,Lord Londonderry,Lord Derby and Walter Long
 
who were traditional gentlemanly elites as sceptical about the pledge of the food taxes, for they
 
recognised it as being the main obstruction to electoral victory.?? On the other hand,Chamberlain’
s die-hard comrades who resisted abandonment of that pledge to the last were, W.A.S.Hewins,
Leopold Amery,Henry Page Croft,George Lloyd,Leo Maxse,George Wyndham,Henry Chaplin and
 
Lord Selborne.?? Ironically,except for the last two they belonged to the middle class. Therefore it
 
is possible to say that paradoxically through abandonment of agricultural protection the traditional
 
gentlemanly elites overcame the imperialistic strategy mainly driven by the middle class and kept their
 
hegemony in the Conservatives.
??Cain and Hopkins,op.cit.,p.199.
??Green,op.cit.,pp.317-319.
??Cain,‘Political Economy’,p.59.;Cain and Hopkins,op.cit.,p.199.
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 Now I turn to the situation concerning the Liberal Government. It is true that the Liberals
 
stubbornly pursued the free trade policy that corresponded with the interests of the City as an
 
international financial centre. However the domestic economic policy of the Liberals strikingly
 
continued encroaching upon the City’s interests. The Liberal Government, especially under the
 
premier Herbert Henry Asquith since 1908,carried out consecutive social policies represented by the
 
Old Age Pensions Act and the National Insurance Act. In turn these social policies were mainly
 
financed by increase in taxes upon rentier class or gentlemanly elites. As B.K.Murray demonstrates,
while the industrial middle class was given the greatest preference as to taxation, the labour class
 
gained the effect of redistribution of income through social policies.?? Therefore, in a sense, it is
 
natural that many financiers showed definite hostility towards the Liberal Government. In fact
 
Anthony Howe has clearly verified the City’s hostility to the Liberal Government.?? I will add some
 
findings to his observation.
It is not so easy to choose the most representative opinion in the City,because,as Daunton has
 
argued,City financiers involved in various occupations.?? However undoubtedly one representative
 
figure was Sir Frederick Banbury. He was a stockbroker as well as a director of the London and
 
Provincial Bank,and was the Conservative M.P.from the constituency of the City from 1906 to 1924.
Unlike another member of the City constituency,Arthur James Balfour,he was a rather unknown
 
backbencher,so he needed to be sensitive to a majority opinion of the constituency in order to keep
 
his position. Banbury always actively joined disputes on financial matters and as a financial
 
specialist consistently argued against every financial and social policy of the Liberal Government.
That is to say,he was fiercely opposed to the income tax reform in 1907 in which differentiation
 
between unearned and earned income was introduced,the Old Age Pensions Bill in 1908,the‘People’
s Budget’in 1909, the National Insurance Bill in 1911,and the Finance Bill in 1914 in which the
 
principle of increasing direct taxes on unearned income was further developed.??
Banbury’s fierce hostility towards the Liberal financial policies was shared by mainstream
 
financiers in the City. For example, according to Lord Avebury, the City petition that opposed
 
introducing the Old-Age Pensions collected some 2,000 signatures in only a week.?? The hostility
??B.K.Murray,The People’s Budget 1909/10,Oxford,1980,pp.293-296.
??Howe,‘The Liberals and the City of London’.
??M.J.Daunton,‘Finance and Politics:Comments’,in Y.Cassis,ed.,Finance and Financiers in European History,
Cambridge,1992.
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5?series,vol.4,cols.583-589,vol.5,cols.54-55,vol.6,cols.1600-1603. As to the National Insurance,Ibid.,vol.27,cols,
1539-1540. As to the Finance Bill in 1914,Ibid.,vol.64,cols.1629-1634.
??Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords),4?ser.vol.192,cols.1402-1403.
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 reached a climax with the open letter signed by representative City figures and the City meeting
 
attended by about one thousand people to protest the People’s Budget.?? As a consequence in the
 
1910 January General Election the constituency of the City overwhelmingly voted for the Conserva-
tive candidates Balfour and Banbury who pledged to introduce Tariff Reform, and defeated the
 
Liberal free trader candidate,Sir Hugh Bell.
Admittedly,as Cain and Hopkins argue,the City’s positive attitude towards fiscal change should
 
be regarded as mere opportunism rather than a sincere expression of support for protectionism.?? But
 
as long as a triumph of the Conservatives in the General Election meant the realisation of Tariff
 
Reform,it is an exaggeration for them to say,‘the two main parties still represented a solid wall of
 
opposition to any fundamental changes in Britain’s internationalist economic policy. It was a wall
 
which the Tariff Reformers could neither scale nor demolish.’??
In fact there was a little possibility to realise Tariff Reform even after the Election, for there
 
remained some room for the Conservatives to negotiate with the Irish Nationalists because of the
 
latter’s antagonism against the People’s Budget. Therefore it is instead possible to say that Britain’
s internationalist economic policy,or free trade policy,was in danger due to nothing other than the
 
opposition by the City,even if that opposition was a reluctant one.
Of course,as Howe also admits,the City’s opposition towards the Liberal Government was not
 
unanimous.?? While the Bankers’Magazine,the Financial Times and the Times were consistently
 
hostile to the Liberal Government,??the Economist and the Statist continued to support the Liberals.
The following article from the Economist criticising the bankers’open letter was probably the typical
 
opinion of the City Liberals.
Briefly put,the complaint is that the principle of graduation has been carried too far both in the income-tax and
 
the death duties,and that on the higher reaches,both of income and of accumulated wealth, the Chancellor of the
 
Exchequer has fallen with excessive severity. ‥‥We agree,but what is the alternative? ‥‥We cannot imagine any
 
sort of new taxation for unproductive purposes which would not, in the words of the signatories,“prove seriously
 
injurious to the commerce and industries of the country.” But we know ―and they know―of proposals for
 
discouraging and even suppressing the foreign trade of the country,which would very speedily ruin the Port of London,
and put an end to our banking and mercantile supremacy. There is this all-important advantage about Mr Lloyd
 
George’s Budget,that the bulk of his proposals do not touch or impede the operations of commerce,though they exact
 
larger contributions from those members of the community who have profited most from their operations.??
Besides,the Free Trader established by the Free Trade Union carried the free trade manifesto
??Cain and Hopkins,op.cit.,p.199.
??Ibid.
??Howe,‘The Liberals and the City of London’
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 signed by many financiers in July 1909.?? However the line-up of the free trade manifesto was rather
 
pale in comparison with that of the bankers’letter to the Liberal Government. Even the Economist
 
and the Statist could not help admitting the strong inclination to the support of Tariff Reform among
 
the City financiers.?? For example, the Economist stated, ‘It seems almost incredible that any
 
Londoner with experiences of the conditions of trade and business in London should waver for a
 
moment in his allegiance to Free-trade. ‥‥Nevertheless,it must be admitted that London opinion
 
on Free-trade is not as whole-hearted and unanimous as it should be,and that,partly owing to their
 
dislike of the alternative proposals,and of the variegated eloquence with which they have been put
 
forward,many from whom a sturdier attitude might have been expected are inclined to bow down
 
before the golden images of Tariff Reform.’??
The Free Trader also carried an article titled‘The City and Tariff Reform’after the Election,and
 
admitted,‘The majority of City men call themselves Tariff Reformers because the majority of City men
 
belong to the Conservative party,and Tariff Reform,was through the agency of Mr.Chamberlain,
made a plank in the platform of the Conservative party.’??
Thus the City Liberals or the City free traders were apparently a minority group as they
 
themselves admitted. In fact even Lord Avebury,who was chairman of the City of London Free
 
Trade Committee,and who was first on the list of the free trade manifesto,stated at the House of
 
Lords, ‘No doubt a subsequent meeting was held to support the Budget, but with one or two
 
exceptions,easy to account for, those responsible for the trade and commerce of the country were
 
conspicuous by their absence. I believe,for instance,that not a single chairman of a bank,of an
 
insurance company,or, indeed,of any great commercial institution attended to support the Prime
 
Minister.’??
As a result he voted for the amendment which practically rejected the Finance Bill. Strikingly
 
as well, former Liberal Prime Minister Lord Rosebery who was a son-in-law of Lord Rothschild
 
fiercely attacked the budget,??with the result that he abstained in the division.
??See Financial Times,May 1,1909 ;Banker’s Magazine,June,1909,pp.820-834.
??The Economist,May 22,1909,p.1067.
??Free Trader,July 15,1909,pp.188-189.
??According to The Statist, ‘Mr. Lloyd George’s Budget was very distasteful to exceedingly powerful parties,
individuals,and groups. It united against it the great majority of the landed interest,the great financial interests,and
 
the liquor interests, while it appealed strongly to Free Traders and the more intelligent of the working classes’.
(underlined by Matsunaga) Ibid.,January 15,1910,p.113.
??The Economist,January 1,1910,p.3.
??Free Trader,May 15,1910,p.124.
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 In a sense it is very natural that gentlemanly elites including City financiers were opposed to the
 
Liberal financial and social policies,as the burden of taxes was mainly imposed upon them and they
 
had no direct interests in the welfare of labourers. If so,is it possible to argue in turn that the Liberal
 
economic policy was mainly determined by consideration for industrial interests? Howe has esch-
ewed such a view that smacks of the economic determinism,instead he proposes the view emphasizing
 
the political motive.?? However I will try to proceed with an economic interpretation below.
As above mentioned, in the early 20th century industrial interests were predominant in the
 
Liberals, and the greatest stronghold of the Liberals was, except for the‘Celtic Fringe’, northern
 
England which was the base of export industries. But during the term from 1895 to 1903, their
 
popularity in northern England was successfully eroded by the Conservatives partly due to the
 
unpopularity of the Home Rule and partly due to the Conservatives’commitment to free trade.
Especially Lancashire and Cheshire,the centre of the cotton industry,held the keystone in General
 
Elections because of their huge industrial populations. Accordingly,as Peter Clarke has argued,the
 
electoral success of the Liberals depended to a great degree upon whether they could recapture this
 
original stronghold or not.?? Therefore the inauguration of the Tariff Reform campaign in 1903
 
presented a unique opportunity for the Liberals to recapture Lancashire. Naturally the Liberals
 
squarely rebutted the tariff reformers’claim that Tariff Reform was a producer’s policy and that Free
 
Trade was a rentier’s policy. Conversely the Liberals insisted that Free Trade was a producer’s
 
policy,as it assured labourers of cheap bread and assured industrialists of high industrial competitive-
ness. Moreover the Liberals insisted that Tariff Reform was a rentier’s policy,as it assured landlords
 
of high rents. That is to say,‘Tariff Reform means happier dukes!’
Thus the 1906 General Election (to a lesser degree, the 1910 General Elections as well) was
 
fought as the battle between the tariff reformer producers’alliance and the free trader producers’
alliance at least in rhetorical terms,because the producer population had far more significance than
 
the tiny gentlemanly capitalist population at the time of an election. As a result the 1906 General
 
Election ended as the overwhelming triumph of the Liberals that succeeded in recapturing northern
 
England. In other words, this was the victory of Manchester, and at the same time the defeat of
 
Birmingham,and at least not unreserved victory of the City. Balfour’s defeat at Manchester and his
 
return to seat at the City was symbolic.
The Liberal social policies can be also understood from the standpoint of industrial interests. It
 
is true that many industrialists showed definite hostility towards the Liberals’social policies,for those
??The Statist,September 18,1909,p.642.
??Howe,‘The Liberals and the City of London’.
??P.Clarke,Lancashire and the New Liberalism,Cambridge,1971,pp.7-9.
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 policies were often regarded as a kind of socialism. But,as Roy Hay has argued,some progressive
 
industrialists supported those policies on the ground that they contributed to employers’interests.??
In fact it is possible to argue that social policy contributes to employer’s interests as well as employee’
s interests in theory. Firstly, improving the purchasing power of labourers through social policy
 
would enlarge home market with the result that especially sheltered industries would gain. Secondly,
social policy might improve labour productivity through strengthening labourers’morale.??
Although these effects were most frequently mentioned,it seems to be not enough on their own to
 
persuade most employers. Therefore I emphasise a third point,the possibility to enable employers
 
to control wages. It is understandable that this point was rarely argued openly,for a mention of the
 
purpose of wage control would have aroused the antagonism of labourers against social policy.??
There were mainly two ways to control wages. One way which was adopted by the Conservative
 
government from 1900 to 1905 was to weaken trade unions through upholding the anti-labour
 
decisions by the House of Lords. In fact, Lord Halsbury, Lord Chancellor in the Conservative
 
government,was a radical anti-unionist.?? The Liberal Government adopted another way,in which
 
they placated labourers and shared wage costs through social policies. In fact,as President of the
 
Board of Trade, Winston Churchill argued at the conference with the employers that the State
 
contribution to the Unemployment Insurance scheme was‘a direct subvention’to industry and that
 
the scheme was‘wages spreading’.?? He also confided this view to the officials of the Board who were
 
responsible for the scheme.??
The potential of social policy to enable the control of wages was particularly significant under
 
free trade policy and the fixed exchange rate of the gold standard,because under such conditions
 
controlling wage levels was indispensable in order to keep industrial competitiveness. Under a
 
protectionist policy that postulates high wages to a certain extent,wage control is not so indispens-
??R.Hay,‘Employers and Social Policy in Britain’,Social History,No.4,1977.;do.,‘Employers’attitudes to social
 
policy and the concept of‘social control’,1900-1920’,in P.Thane,ed.,The Origin of British Social Policy,London,
1978.
??This was the main ground the Board of Trade based on. William Beveridge wrote,‘Employers would derive benefit
 
from the scheme,in so far as it keeps workmen from starvation during their idle moments. Employers will gain also
 
through the better discipline of their men, who will be unwilling to risk forfeiting their unemployed benefit by
 
misbehaviour.’‘Unemployed Insurance,Objections and Answers’,in Beveridge Papers at the LSE Library,III.37,A.
3,p.3.
??One friendly society argued against social policy on the ground that the proposals of middle class politicians were
 
means of evading the just demands of the working class for higher wages. P.Thane,‘Non-contributory versus Insurance
 
Pensions 1878-1908’,Thane ed.,op.cit.,p.94.
??J.Ramsden,An Appetite for Power,London,1998,pp.195-196.
??Board of Trade,‘Minutes of the Conference with the Engineering Employers’Association and the Shipbuilding
 
Employers’Federation’,p.29.(dated 18 August,1909.) LAB2/211/LE500/1909,at the Public Record Office.
??W.S.Churchill,‘Note on Malingering’,in Beveridge Papers,III.39,11.,p.3. J.Harris,Unemployment and Politics,
Oxford,1972,p.310
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 able. In fact Joseph Chamberlain finally could withdraw the promise of old-age pensions,insisting
 
that high wages under the protection would give labourers enough welfare. Therefore,in a sense,it
 
is possible to argue that the Liberal free trade policy required social policy to control wages in order
 
to keep Britain’s industrial competitiveness.
Thus,at least from the standpoint of the export industries,the combination of free trade with
 
social policy under the Liberal Government corresponded with their interests. If one accepts this
 
view, the division in the Manchester Chamber of Commerce over the pros and cons of National
 
Insurance can be interpreted as the division between those who supported the Insurance from the
 
viewpoint of the longer term and those who opposed it from the viewpoint of the shorter term.?? In
 
other words,the latter(the rebel led by Sir Charles Macara)emphasised the increase in productive
 
cost due to the employers’contribution to the insurance fund,while the former(the mainstreamer in
 
the Chamber)expected that that cost would be compensated by strengthening the negotiating power
 
of employers over wages.
In trying to understand the Liberal economic policy from the standpoint of industrial interests,
the Board of Trade under the Liberal Government should be regarded as a key actor. In other words,
the Board of Trade was the citadel of the Liberal producers’alliance. As is widely known the Board
 
of Trade was a traditional stronghold of free trade,and played a major role as a propagandizer in
 
opposing the Tariff Reform campaign. After 1905,under David Lloyd George and Churchill, the
 
Board of Trade unfolded dynamic activity above all on the aspect of social and industrial policies. In
 
addition,the energetic Permanent Secretary Hubert Llewellyn Smith succeeded in taking the initiative
 
in commercial policy from the Foreign Office.?? According to J.A.M.Caldwell,in terms of expendi-
ture,while the civil service as a whole increased its outlay by 124 per cent from 1900 to 1914, the
 
comparable figure for the Board of Trade was 595 per cent. Its increase in establishment between the
 
same years of 821 per cent was equally abnormal.??
Thus the Commercial,Labour and Statistical Department at the Board of Trade unfolded social
 
policy(such as the Unemployment Insurance)and industrial policy(such as the Trade Boards and
 
Labour Exchanges Acts)as well as commercial diplomacy.?? And this dynamic activity of the Board
 
of Trade can be regarded as the main part of the Liberal industrial strategy in which free trade policy
 
was organically connected with domestic economic policy.
Roger Davidson has interpreted social and industrial policies of the Board of Trade under the
??As to the revolt by Macara, see Hay,op.cit., p.440. As to the view of W.T.Stubbs,President of the Manchester
 
Chamber of Commerce,see The Manchester Chamber of Commerce Monthly Record,July 31,1911,pp.195-196.
??R.Davidson,‘Llewellyn Smith,the Labour Department and government growth 1886-1909’,in G.Sutherland,Studies
 
in the Growth of Nineteenth-Century Government,London,1972,p.262.
??Cited in ibid.,p.227.
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 framework of‘social control’,and has verified that basically civil servants at the Board pursued the
 
controlling of wage levels.?? This view corroborates my thesis that the primary purpose of the
 
Liberal economic policy was to keep Britain’s industrial competitiveness.
If one accepts that the industrial interests were a priority for the Liberals, the next question will
 
emerge. That is to say,was the combination of complete free trade with free capital export under the
 
Liberal Government really beneficial to industry as a whole?
Firstly,if the Liberals prioritised industrial interests,it would be more natural that they adopt
 
retaliatory tariffs for industries, not complete free trade. Retaliatory tariffs that were not ac-
companied by agricultural tariffs would be congruent with the interests of export industries as well
 
as those of home industries,as retaliation would enable British government to negotiate reduction of
 
other countries’tariffs. In fact Frank Trentmann has verified that a majority of industrialists
 
supported retaliation,the middle way between complete free trade and the full Tariff Reform in the
 
Edwardian age.?? Therefore,it is certainly difficult to interpret the motive for the Liberal free trade
 
policy in terms of economic interests alone.
To understand this point,rather we should turn to Trentmann’s other argument that Britain’s free
 
trade in those days should be interpreted from the perspective of Britain’s political culture. In short,
the political culture of free trade was so dominant that free trade was regarded as a symbol of social
 
progress while Tariff Reform was regarded as a symbol of plutocracy. In other words,free trade
 
symbolised a kind of Weltanshauung rather than a mere expression of economic interests.??
Undoubtedly this argument is successful in explaining the reason why the Liberals adhered to
 
unreserved free trade policy to the end. However his thesis that the consumer politics of Free Trade
 
defeated the producer politics of Tariff Reform in the battle of political culture is disputable,if not
 
deniable. For, as I have already argued, the Liberal free trade can be interpreted as not only
 
consumer’s policy but also as producer’s policy. In fact,J.A.Hobson,whose vision of the‘citizen
 
consumer’is used as a keyword by Trentmann, argued in his article analysing the 1910 General
 
Election that the Election had been the battle between ‘a Producer’s England’(northern England)
supporting the Liberals and ‘a Consumer’s England’(southern England) supporting the Conserva-
??Above all,Llewellyn Smith not only authored the draft of the Unemployment Insurance scheme from 1908 to 1909,
but also practically negotiated the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty on his own from 1910 to 1911. FO 881/9873,
at the PRO.
??R.Davidson, ‘The Board of Trade and Industrial Relations 1896-1914’, Historical Journal, vol.21, 1978.;do.,
Whitehall and the Labour Problem in Late-Victorian and Edwardian England,London,1985,passim.
??F.Trentmann,‘The Transformation of Fiscal Reform’,Historical Journal,vol.39,1996,pp.1009-1024.
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 tives.?? In the context of this article,the term of‘consumer’was clearly used with a negative nuance.
In addition,through his life Hobson consistently pursued the vision of the producers’alliance that
 
competed against rentiers. In that sense,his free trade ideology was also connected with producer’
s interests as well as consumer’s interests. Thus,the aspect of the Liberal free trade as a producer’
s policy should not be overlooked,even if this aspect was not the whole but the part.
Now I will turn to the second point,skyrocketing capital export under the Liberal Government.
Originally the increase in capital export had already begun under the Conservative government since
 
the beginning of the 20th century. Major turning point was the Colonial Stock Act in 1900
 
introduced by Joseph Chamberlain. And forerunners of criticism of capital export were the Liberal
 
radicals such as Hobson and Leo Chiozza Money as well as the tariff reformers.
Hobson had already written the article about the effect of capital export in 1891. In this article
 
he argued that Britain’s capital export would enable Asian countries to develop their own industries
 
with the result that Britain would be deindustrialised (though he did not use this expression)in the
 
near future. Accordingly in conclusion he proposed taxation on foreign investments to prevent such
 
a situation.?? This critical opinion against capital export was repeated in his masterpiece,Imperial-
ism in 1902.?? Although Hobson has been known exclusively as a typical internationalist,we learn
 
from this argument his another aspect as an economic nationalist.?? In fact,in a theoretical level it
 
is possible to argue that his underconsumptionist theory was a kind of economic nationalism,because
 
that theory inclined to emphasise the significance of a home market,not a foreign market. In other
 
words, his underconsumptionist theory aimed to build a self-sustained national economy through
 
enlarging a home market. This strange coexistence of economic nationalism with an internationalist
 
free trade ideology would be succeeded by John Maynard Keynes,a representative ideologue of the
 
Liberals in 1920s. Moreover Keynes would succeed Hobson’s vision of the producers’alliance
 
competing against rentiers.
In 1905,in turn,Chiozza Money published Riches and Poverty,in which he severely criticised
??Do.,‘Political Culture and Political Economy’,Review of International Political Economy,5:2,1998.;do.,‘Civil
 
Society,Commerce,and the Citizen-Consumer’,in Trentmann,ed.,Paradoxes of Civil Society,Oxford,2000.;do.,
‘National Identity and Consumer Politics’, in D.Winch and P.K.O’Brien, eds., The Political Economy of British
 
Historical Experience, Oxford, 2002. Howe also emphasizes the ideological factor. A.C.Howe, Free Trade and
 
Liberal England 1846-1946,Oxford,1997,pp.266-273.
??J.A.Hobson,‘The General Election:A Sociological Interpretation’,Sociological Review,vol.3,1910,p.112.
??J.A.Hobson,‘Can England Keep Her Trade?’,National Review,No.97,1891.
??Do.,Imperialism: A Study,London,1902,pp.51-61,357-360.
??In fact Hobson stated,‘The true friend of internationalism,as distinguished from the more amorphous cosmopolitan,
most urgently desires the maintenance of nationalism‥‥Free Trade is essential to this nationalism,and thence derives
 
much not only of its economic,but of its ethical validity.’ Do.,‘The Inner Meaning of Protectionism’,Contemporary
 
Review,vol.84,1903,p.372.
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 capital export on the ground that decrease in domestic investments was responsible for the prevailing
 
poverty.??
Thus,arguably there was a common recognition between the Liberal radicals and the radical
 
tariff reformers or the Constructive Imperialists in that both of them championed producer’s interests
 
and at the same time were antagonistic towards cosmopolitan financiers indifferent to interests of
 
national economy.?? In fact Hobson sometimes uttered that a defect of protectionism consisted in its
 
inability to reach the goal rather than in the goal of protectionism itself.??
In the meantime the pace of capital export accelerated since the Liberals had come to office in
 
1905. Since then, criticism of capital export became rather a patent of the Conservatives, as the
 
accelerating capital export gave them an expedient pretext to attack the Liberal Government. In the
 
backdrop of abnormal increase in capital export since 1910 was the onslaught on landed interests by
 
the Liberal Government through the tax policy. In short,landowners vended their lands one after
 
another, in turn returns gained by disposition of lands were converted into stock investments,
especially foreign investments. As long as investments on lands were converted into stock invest-
ments,industrial interests were not necessarily disadvantaged. Rather it is possible to say that one
 
important factor causing the unprecedented export boom since 1910 was this skyrocketing capital
 
export. Therefore it is also possible to say that export industries,which were the greatest power base
 
of the Liberals,also gained by the increase in capital export at least for the time being. However it
 
is also true that there was a clear gap between foreign investments and export trades,as British foreign
 
investments were not accompanied by the condition that ensured purchase of British goods.
Therefore there is also the possibility that stagnation or decrease in domestic investments inflicted a
 
loss upon home industries while excessive foreign investments were no longer so advantageous for
 
export industries.??
As a result a fierce controversy came about on the effect of capital export. In February 1909 at
 
the House of Commons the controversy was ignited by Balfour who accused the government of
 
ignoring the bad effect caused by capital flight. According to him, the free trade policy and the
 
extravagant finance pursued by the government was driving capital abroad. This opinion was
 
seconded by Banbury.?? In the following month the controversy was developed by the motion moved
 
by Stanley Baldwin who was known as a committed tariff reformer. This motion says,‘That,in the
??L.Chiozza Money,Riches and Poverty,London,1905,Chapter 12.
??For the argument of the Constructive Imperialists, see P.J.Cain, ‘The Economic Philosophy of Constructive
 
Imperialism’,in C.Navari,ed.,British Politics and the Spirit of the Age,Keele,1995.
??Hobson,‘Can England Keep’,pp.10-11.;do.,‘The Inner Meaning’,pp.367-369.;do.,The Conditions of Industrial
 
Peace,London,1927,pp.106-108.
??A.Offer,‘Empire and Social Reform’,Historical Journal,vol.26,1983,pp.129-132.
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 opinion of this House,the feeling of insecurity,due to the policy of His Majesty’s Government,to the
 
unfair competition of foreign producers in British markets,and to the high tariffs of foreign countries,
has caused capital to be employed abroad which might have been used at home to the great advantage
 
of the wage-earning population of the country.’??
On the surface it seems that the dispute was fought between the Conservative tariff reformers
 
supporting industrial interests and the Liberal free traders supporting financier’s interests. But such
 
a view is simplistic. The purpose of Baldwin’s motion can be regarded as dual. Firstly,it aimed to
 
justify Tariff Reform through the argument that unfair competition with foreign industries necessitated
 
capital export. Secondly,it aimed to check radicalisation of financial policy through the argument
 
that such a radical policy would cause more capital flight. In fact Baldwin said,‘the English investor
 
during the last year has gone abroad,not for the purpose of increasing his income or surplus capital,
but because he is uncertain as to what extra taxation may be or will be put upon his security,and he
 
is alarmed at prospective legislation which may come or must come,because he is afraid that the
 
Government of this country is coquetting with the Socialistic influence at the other end of their
 
party.’??
Seconding this motion,Austen Chamberlain also insisted,‘The Government refuse to take,it is
 
part of their principles that they do not take,any direct Governmental action which may increase our
 
trade,which may add to our security,and which may promote our industrial supremacy. On the
 
other hand they are not stinted of Governmental means by which they can spread unrest and
 
uncertainty,and by which they can check the investment of capital and drive investors to put their
 
money elsewhere.’??
Eventually,Baldwin’s motion was overwhelmingly defeated,instead the motion by the Liberals
 
was carried. That is to say,‘That this House regards both the steady increase in the amount of British
 
capital invested in British Colonies and foreign countries,and the character and distribution of such
 
investments,with satisfaction as being a consequence and an evidence of the fundamental stability and
 
prosperity of the domestic industries and the commerce of the United Kingdom’??
The Conservatives’above argument against capital export or capital flight is characteristic in that
 
they targeted only at the government,and that they never targeted at investors. Regulation of capital
 
export was by no means proposed. Rather,the activity of investors was regarded as understandable
 
by the Conservatives. In that point the Conservatives’criticism of capital export was substantially
 
different from that of the Liberal radicals. Therefore the Conservatives’criticism of capital export
??Parliamentary Debates (Commons),5?ser.,vol.1,cols.31-32,78-79.
??Ibid.,vol.2,col.1145.
??Ibid.,col.1148.
??Ibid.,col.1180.
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 should be regarded as an expediency rather than the expression of sincere concern about domestic
 
industries.?? In fact Churchill sharply rebutted,‘What a situation! What an exhibition of patriot-
ism! At a moment when,according to the right hon. Gentleman［Austen Chamberlain］,supreme
 
exertions are needed to maintain the safety of this country,persons who have fortune,and whose
 
wealth is great in this world,are engaged in rapidly making investments in foreign countries in order
 
that they may thereby be able to dodge the income tax Commissioner.’??
In short,he indicated that the true motive of the Conservatives was to defend the interests of
 
gentlemanly elites rather than the interests of domestic industries. His criticism would be corroborat-
ed by the dispute at the House of Lords.
At the House of Lords Lord Rothschild,and Lord Revelestoke,partner of Baring Bros.,were in
 
the vanguard of criticism of capital export or capital flight.?? Naturally both of them defended the
 
activity of investors and at the same time insisted that capital flight had a bad influence on industries.
Thus,as far as the tariff reformers dared not to attack financiers,they made a fatal compromise with
 
the financial power of the City.
On the other hand,it might be possible to argue that the Liberals also betrayed the industrial
 
interests,as far as capital export was divorced from export trades to a certain extent. Therefore it is
 
certainly difficult to insist that the Liberals prioritised industrial interests in any case. However we
 
should not overlook the fact that finally the Liberals changed the course and undertook regulation of
 
capital export.
In 1914, Chiozza Money resumed the attack on capital export.?? The Liberal Government
 
introduced taxes on foreign investments in the same year.?? Although the amount of the tax was only
 
20,000 pounds in the first year,the amount was planned to increase to 500,000 pounds after years.
Suggestively, the Conservatives were fiercely opposed to this policy. Austen Chamberlain also
 
seconded the amendment that colonial investments should be allowed the deduction.?? We learn
??Ibid.,col.1157.
??On this point I do not agree with Howe,as he accepts their sincere intention. Howe,‘The Liberals and the City
 
of London’. Hobson’s and Keynes’s argument for capital export at this time should be considered under their
 
intention to defend the Liberal Government,not to defend investors. See Hobson,An Economic Interpretation of
 
Investment,London,1911.;J.M.Keynes,‘Great Britain’s foreign investments’,New Quarterly,1910,reprinted in The
 
Collected Writings of J.M.Keynes,vol.15,London,1971. In fact,in his article Hobson targeted at the argument of
 
the Banker’s Magazine.(pp.81-83.) As far as his underconsumptionist theory was realized by the Liberal Govern-
ment,it was natural for him to defend the Liberal policy at any cost. Young Keynes was also a fervent Liberal,and
 
already revealed a critical view on the City financiers in those days. See the letter from Keynes to Basil Blackett in
 
June 1914,in The Collected Writings of J.M.Keynes,vol.16,p.5.
??Parliamentary Debates (Commons),5?ser.,vol.2,col.1181.
??Parliamentary Debates (Lords),vol.4,cols.796-799,1155-1156. Offer,op.cit.,p.123.
??L.Chiozza Money,The Nation’s Wealth,London,1914. Hobson also resumed the attack on capital export. J.A.
Hobson,The New Protectionism,London,1916,pp.117-118.
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 from this fact that he did not hesitate to victimise industrial interests in order to pursue imperialism.
In the division the Conservatives unitedly voted against the provision and voted for the amendment,
while the Liberals unitedly voted for the provision and voted agaisnt the amendment.?? It should be
 
also noted that the opponents of the provision included the die-hard tariff reformers such as Hewins,
Page Croft,George Lloyd,and Halford Mackinder. One Liberal MP struck home,‘all these hon.
Gentlemen［the Conservatives］ will talk about money invested abroad. We want to bring it back
 
and have it invested here. Have you any objection to that?’?? Eventually,the provision was carried
 
and the amendment was rejected. Probably this case is the best example to demonstrate the view that
 
generally the Liberal free traders were more earnest than the Conservative tariff reformers in pursuing
 
industrial or producer’s interests.
However it should be admitted that the pursuit of industrial interests by the Liberals did not
 
necessarily mean that they aimed to destroy financial interests.(As for landed interests or landowner’
s interests,arguably the Liberals aimed to destroy them.) Although the Liberals tried to redistribute
 
resources from rentiers to producers with the result that they aroused the rage of the City, they
 
presupposed prosperity of the financial sector. The Liberals fully recognised that British economy
 
highly relied upon the financial sector. Accordingly they did not dare to attack the basic frame of
 
the British financial empire.
In other words,if the Liberal free traders attacked financial interests as plutocracy,they did not
 
attack the function of the financial sector as such. Conversely if the radical tariff reformers or the
 
Constructive Imperialists tried to attack the function of the financial sector at least in rhetorical terms,
they did not attack financial interests as plutocracy because of their alliance with gentlemanly elites.
In that sense,it is difficult to answer which camp was more radical on their attitude towards the City
 
in rhetorical terms. But undoubtedly the Liberal free traders were more radical in practical terms.
?
The hegemony of the Liberals was destroyed by the First World War. The formation of the Lloyd
 
George Coalition Government raises a suggestive case study. With the ousting of Asquith,most
 
central members of the Liberal Imperialists left the government while the Liberal radicals were
 
divided. The Liberal radicals such as Churchill,Chiozza Money,T.J.Macnamara,and Christopher
 
Addison followed Lloyd George. Meanwhile the Conservatives unitedly supported Lloyd George
 
for the time being,although there was difference in the degree of loyalty. Interestingly,the Conserva-
??So far as I know,only Offer has noted its significance. Offer,op.cit.,p.138.
??Parliamentary Debates (Commons),5?ser.,vol.65,cols.382-385.
??Ibi d.,vol.64,cols.1641-1646;Ibid.,vol.65,cols.401-406.
??Ibid.,vol.64,col.1635.
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 tive engineers of the Coalition were rather the radical tariff reformers such as Alfred Milner, J.L.
Garvin,Lord Beaverbrook,F.E.Smith,and Amery. Especially,‘Milner’s entry to the War Cabinet
 
in December 1916 is generally treated as one of the most surprising events of the whole strange
 
crisis’??, for he was a maverick within the Conservatives. Thus, with the inauguration of the
 
Coalition,a strange alliance between the Liberal radicals and the radical tariff reformers emerged.
According to Robert Scally,Lloyd George and those tariff reformers agreed on the vision of dynamic
 
and organised capitalism that was expressed by the word,the‘National Efficiency’.?? In other words,
they regarded the War as a unique opportunity to attain this vision. If it is true that the tariff
 
reformers always prioritised the purpose of imperialism over industrial interests, it would be an
 
exaggeration to say that their concern about industrial conditions was always mere hypocrisy.
Therefore one can say that the alliance between the Liberal radicals and the radical tariff reformers
 
was enabled due to their common recognition which I have formerly mentioned.
Strictly speaking,the reaction among the radical tariff reformers to the Coalition was polarised
 
into two extremes. Some radical tariff reformers such as Maxse and Page Croft were hostile towards
 
the Coalition,although they acknowledged themselves as enthusiastic supporters of industrial inter-
ests. We can interpret this polarisation as follows. On the one hand, those tariff reformers who
 
regarded anti-imperialism among the Liberals as surmountable loyally supported the Coalition.
They also regarded the alliance with the Liberals as beneficial in order to overwhelm the hegemony
 
of gentlemanly elites within the Conservatives whom Milner despisingly called‘Mandarin’.?? On the
 
other hand,those tariff reformers who regarded the alliance with the Liberals as a mere obstruction
 
to the creed of imperialism or the political right were hostile to the Coalition.
Eventually, the expectation of both Liberal and Conservative Coalitionists who pursued the
 
vision of progressive industrial capitalism did not come true.?? The Whitley Committee appointed
 
by the Asquith government,whose member included J.A.Hobson,undertook the construction of the
 
producers’alliance by institutionalising capital-labour-cooperation through state intervention,??but
 
the Report of the Committee was ignored by both industrialists and labourers who preferred the
 
approach of the voluntarism. In addition,the National Industrial Conference from 1919 to 1921 that
??P.A.Lockwood,‘Milner’s Entry into the War Cabinet,December 1916’,Historical Journal,vol.7,1964,p.120.
??Scally op.cit,passim. He traces the origin of the Coalition back to the Constitutional Crisis in 1910. See also,Cain
 
and Hopkins, op.cit., p.198n.;G.R.Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency, Oxford, 1971, Chapter 6. But
 
sagaciously Searle indicates that in reality not the National Efficiency movement but the Liberal radicals had the
 
initiative over policies in the pre-war years. Strangely, it seems that Lloyd George tended to overestimate the
 
radicalism among the Conservatives as well as underestimate the radicalism among his Liberal colleagues.
??Milner wrote in 1916,the only thing that could save the situation would be‘the consistent display of qualities which
 
are the absolute antithesis of what we know of Asquith,McKenna,Simon,et hoc genus omne,and I fear I must add
 
of A.J.B.,Lansdowne,and most of their Unionist colleagues’. Cited in Lockwood,op.cit.,p.120.
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 also tried to institutionalise capital-labour-cooperation got nowhere. As Rodney Lowe argues,as
 
long as actors in industries were antipathetic, those plans would have been realised only by the
 
compelling initiative of leading politicians. However Lloyd George himself seemed to lose his
 
original enthusiasm about industrial problems temporarily,partly because of his concentration upon
 
foreign policy,and partly because of the necessity for maintaining the relation with the Conserva-
tives.?? As for the later years of the Coalition,traditional elites in the Conservatives succeeded in
 
taking an initiative as a whole,as indicated by the deflationary policy from 1921. In other words,
gentlemanly capitalists were rehabilitated.
But the rehabilitation was not yet complete,for the Coalition Government was still regarded as
 
being too radical by them. And this remaining radicalism of the Coalition was,as Kenneth Morgan
 
says,mainly attributable to the Coalition Liberals,or‘Lloyd George’s Stage Army’.?? In the end,
with the fall of the Coalition,gentlemanly elites regained full hegemony.
In fact,the makeup of the Bonar Law government that replaced the Coalition was unique in that
 
no fewer than seven out of 16 Cabinet ministers were peers including a duke,two marquesses,an earl,
and three viscounts.?? This makeup was basically succeeded by the Baldwin government in the
 
following year. Moreover,through the inter-war years the radical tariff reformers or the Constructive
 
Imperialists were efficiently shut out from the axis of power of the Conservatives,whether they were
 
the Coalitionists or the anti-Coalitionists.?? Rare exception were Amery and Austen Chamberlain.
But even they, respectively as Colonial Secretary and Foreign Secretary,had little influence upon
 
economic policy. Afterwards in the 1930s,Amery would complain about the imperial preference
 
system,arguing that it was far from the realisation of the Constructive Imperialists’original ideal.
The anti-Coalitionists such as Page Croft and Maxse were also completely marginalised. Croft
 
founded the National Party in 1917 and advocated ultra-nationalism and at the same time continued
 
attacking‘international moneylenders’who,he insisted,were virtually ruling the Coalition. He also
 
insisted that only the National Party was a real partner of industry and proposed the organised
??The undertaking of the Export Credits scheme by the Board of Trade since 1921 was one of the exceptional cases,
though its scale was strictly constrained. BT 65/8/2326,at the PRO.
??RECO 1/265,MUN 4/5169,at the PRO.
??R.Lowe,‘The Failure of Consensus in Britain:The National Industrial Conference,1919-1921’,Historical Journal,
vol.21,1978,pp.658-659.
??K.O.Morgan,‘Lloyd George’s Stage Army:The Coalition Liberals,1918-22’,in A.J.P.Taylor,ed.,Lloyd George:
Twelve Essays,London,1971.
??W.D.Rubinstein,Twentieth-Century Britain,London,2003,p.131.
??Milner wrote in 1923,‘Separated from one political party by my advanced views on social questions,still more widely
 
separated from others by my faith in the Empire and my attachment to national rather than cosmopolitan ideals,I often
 
seem to myself to be‘’ploughing a lonely furrow”.’ Lord Milner,Questions of the Hour,London, 1924, preface.
Garvin would advocate another coalition headed by Lloyd George in 1930 as a consequence of his despair at the
 
Conservatives. R.Skidelsky,Politicians and the Slump,London,1967,pp.278-279.
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 production and the expansion of production,although his argument was rather‘schizophrenic’in that
 
he enthusiastically defended the privileged class at the same time.?? At last the National Party was
 
practically absorbed into the Conservatives again by 1922.
However it should be also admitted that the die-hard libertarians such as Lord Hugh and Robert
 
Cecils were also marginalised within the Conservatives partly because of their commitment to free
 
trade and partly because of the unpopularity of libertarianism among the majority of voters.
Therefore, strictly speaking, mainstreamers in the Conservatives were moderate libertarians or
 
superficial collectivists.
Thus,the reign of Bonar Law,Baldwin,later Neville Chamberlain over the Conservatives in the
 
inter-war years was characterised by the supremacy of the gentlemanly elites in spite of those leaders’
superficial commitment to protectionism. Generally they preferred the laissez faire approach
 
advocated by mainstream financiers and neglected collectivistic approach to relieve the predicament
 
of industries.?? It is difficult to answer to what extent they deliberately championed financial
 
interests. It is highly probable that their essential negativism to state intervention and the strong
 
Treasury control since 1919 coincided with financial interests. But it is also certain that they heavily
 
relied upon the support of financiers,or gentlemanly elites. As political historians argue,the pledge
 
of protectionism by Baldwin in the 1923 General Election should be interpreted from the viewpoint
 
of his political motive to cut off the prospect of another coalition with the Liberals,for his leadership
 
had originally arisen from his successful instigation against the Coalition.
In turn the City opportunistically supported protectionism again. As for Baldwin’s pledge in
 
1923,City’s attitude to it was genial. According to the Times,‘The firmness of the exchange,as well
 
as stock markets,was attributed to growing confidence that the Conservative Party will be returned
 
to power to-day. The City,of course,has always stood for the principle of free trade as the soundest
 
foundation of this country’s economic policy,but it recognizes that Mr.Baldwin,in asking the electors
 
to give his Government a free hand in finding a solution for an exceptional unemployment problem,
under wholly abnormal circumstances, is doing a straightforward thing. The City, therefore, has
 
decided to help him in trying the expedient of protection as a remedy for our trade troubles.’??
In fact,the Conservative candidates got unopposed return in the constituency of the City in the
 
Election. It is clear that the regressive effect of tariffs attracted the City again. Unlike the situation
??W.D.Rubinstein,‘Henry Page Croft and the National Party 1917-22’,Journal of Contemporary History,vol.9,1974,
pp.140-143.
??As to Neville Chamberlain,it is certainly difficult to regard him as a mere superficial collectivist,for his work at
 
the Ministry of Health in the 1920s was outstanding. But in the inter-war years the focus of economic policy shifted
 
from social policy to industrial policy, and as Chancellor of the Exchequer he was quite negative concerning the
 
industrial policy in the 1930s.
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 in the pre-war years,there were few heated arguments in the City. Therefore one can say that by this
 
time the City,or at least a majority of financiers,had fully overcome their antipathy to tariffs. In
 
other words,they had nearly completed preparation for the Ottawa system long before its advent.
Now I will turn to the situation for the Liberals in the post-war years. After the War those
 
conditions which had supported their strategy of producers’alliance were almost completely lost.
In political terms, the Labour’s abandonment of the pact for electoral cooperation with the
 
Liberals destroyed the‘Progressive Alliance’that had been the political power base of the Liberal
 
producers’alliance. What is more,the Liberals were divided by the personal feud between Lloyd
 
George and Asquith,although this rift was overcome in 1923.
In economic terms,export industries in northern England that were the largest supporting base
 
of the Liberals fell into a perpetual depression. As for the unemployment rate,northern England
 
showed a far better performance than southern England and the Midlands which were the supporting
 
base of the Conservatives in the Edwardian age. In contrast,after the War,industries in southern
 
England and the Midlands showed a far better performance than those in northern England.??
Undoubtedly this was one factor in the Conservative hegemony in the inter-war years.
In addition, the Board of Trade, the citadel of the producers’alliance under the Liberal
 
Government,was vastly weakened,partly due to the strengthening Treasury control,partly due to the
 
transfer of the energetic Permanent Secretary,Llewellyn Smith. But probably the main reason was
 
that the charge of social policy and industrial policy was transferred to the Ministry of Labour.
According to Rodney Lowe,ironically the foundation of the Ministry of Labour had a rather negative
 
effect on the pursuit of dynamic industrial policy in the inter-war years.??
Thus,it was essential for the Liberals to search for an entirely new strategy. The first movement
 
for the new industrial strategy was generated in Manchester by the members of the New Manchester
 
School, such as Ernest Simon and Ramsay Muir. Originally they belonged to the Asquithian
 
Liberals,and founded the Liberal Summer School in 1921.?? After the reunion of the Liberals,Lloyd
 
George succeeded in taking the initiative of this movement. The movement was vastly stimulated by
 
the entry of J.M.Keynes.
Although Keynes and Lloyd George had been estranged over the Versailles treaty, they were
 
reconciled through the agreement on the new industrial policy. That opportunity was given due to
??The Times,December 8,1923,p.18.
??D.H.Aldcroft,The Inter-War Economy,London,1970,p.80.
??R.Lowe,‘The Ministry of Labour,1916-1919’,in K.Burk,War and the State,London,1982.
??M.Freeden,Liberalism Divided,Oxford,1986,pp.
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 the article on the Nation and the Athenaeum written by Lloyd George in 1924. In this article,Lloyd
 
George insisted that the depression of export industries was mainly attributable to structural problems
 
rather than transitory problems,and that only government intervention could enable those industries
 
to be revived. That is to say,‘It is no avail to spend time on distribution if production lags behind
 
the common need. The best means of achieving production seems to be the most urgent task of our
 
industrial and political leaders at this hour.’??
In short,Lloyd George declared that the Liberal new strategy would be aggressive industrial
 
policy to rescue industries,although the concrete contents of that policy were not yet so obvious.
Keynes,one of the directors of the Nation,supported Lloyd George,and wrote the article which put
 
forward more concrete proposals. That is, ‘The Chancellor of the Exchequer should devote his
 
sinking fund and his surplus resources, not to redeeming old debt with the result of driving the
 
national savings to find a foreign outlet,but to replacing unproductive debt by productive debt. The
 
Treasury should not shrink from promoting expenditure up to(say)100,000,000 pounds a year on the
 
construction of capital works at home,enlisting in various ways the aid of private genius,tempera-
ment,and skill.’??
Although their proposals bore no fruit due to the catastrophic defeat of the Liberals in the 1924
 
General Election,Keynes gradually became the central figure of the Liberal brains thereafter. In fact
 
his proposals would soon be adopted by the Liberals. As for his ideology,A Tract on Monetary
 
Reform in 1923 is suggestive. In this book,Keynes presented his own tripartite classification of
 
classes,the investing class,the business class,and the earner. He argued that inflation was beneficial
 
to the business man and the earner, and at the same time was injurious to the investor. As for
 
deflation,vice versa.?? He concludes,‘Thus Inflation is unjust and Deflation is inexpedient. Of the
 
two perhaps Deflation is,if we rule out exaggerated inflations such as that of Germany,the worse;
because it is worse, in an impoverished world, to provoke unemployment than to disappoint the
 
rentier.’??(italic in the original)
Keynes implied that the Liberals were a representative of the business class and the earner (or
 
producers’alliance)while the Conservatives were a representative of the investing class(or gentleman-
ly elites). It should be noted that in this respect Keynes’s understanding was basically common with
 
Hobson’s one in the pre-war years.
??Nation and the Athenaeum,April 12,1924,pp.39-40.
??Ibid.,May 24,1924,p.236.
??J.M.Keynes,A Tract on Monetary Reform,London,1924,pp.30-39.
??Ibid.,p.40.
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 The target of A Tract on Monetary Reform was the movement towards the restoration of the gold
 
standard at the pre-war par that would bring about deflation. Since the Cunliffe Report in 1919 this
 
movement was advancing steadily. As a result,the Baldwin government decided to press forward in
 
1925.
There were some negative opinions over the return to the gold standard. For example, as
 
witnesses for the Chamberlain-Bradbury Committee in 1924,the representative of the Federation of
 
British Industries and Sir Robert Horne,leader of the Conservative industrial group,suggested rather
 
pessimistic view which noticed deflationary impact on industries,although they did not oppose return
 
to gold as such.?? As for Horne,it should be noted that he had been recruited by Lloyd George into
 
the Coalition Government as the Minister of Labour thereafter the Chancellor of the Exchequer and
 
that as an earnest Coalitionist he continued to remain a dissenter within the Conservatives.
Moreover, according to Robert Boyce, Baldwin abandoned the idea of selecting Horne as the
 
Chancellor,as he learned that the City would not welcome his reappointment.??
On the other hand,in fact few people dared to flatly oppose return to gold. Of the witnesses at
 
the Committee,only Keynes and Reginald McKenna opposed return to gold practically.?? They were
 
Liberal or ex-Liberal. McKenna,chairman of the Midland Bank,‘was the only banker who had
 
opposed an early return to gold’??. However he used to belong to conservative group in the Liberals
 
in the pre-war years,and seemed to prefer financial orthodoxy in those days.?? Presumably,the main
 
factor in his conversion was his status as chairman of the Midland Bank since 1919.
Originally his predecessor E.H.Holden,the Liberal MP(1906-10),was also known as a heretic
 
in the City. Holden was a heretic especially in that he eagerly defended industrial interests. For
 
example,he attacked the Bank of England and demanded that they increase the gold reserve in case
 
of a financial panic. According to his opinion,such a financial panic would cause serious damage
 
to industry.?? In fact his prediction would be realised in 1931. Doubtless this Holden’s stance was
 
concerned with the interest of the Midland Bank itself. The Midland Bank was‘the only one of the
 
great joint-stock banks which could fairly claim to have close links with industry’.?? Under Holden’
s powerful management the Midland Bank grew into the largest bank in Britain through perpetual
 
amalgamation. During that process the Midland Bank gained a stronghold in Lancashire.??
??D.E.Moggridge,British Monetary Policy 1924-1931,Cambridge,1972,p.46.
??Boyce,op.cit.,pp.72-73.
??Moggridge,op.cit.,p.42.
??Boyce,op.cit.,p.53.
??E.g.he publicly opposed the income tax reform in 1907. Parliamentary Debates (Commons),4?ser.,vol.177,cols.
768-769.
??Address at the General Meeting of the Shareholders of the London Joint City and Midland Bank ltd. T/185/1,at
 
the PRO.
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 Therefore the name of the bank was confusing. In addition,Holden himself was from Bolton and
 
the MP for Heywood,Manchester,and was a unique banker in that he rose from an accountant.??
Thus,it might be possible to say that the Lancashire connection of both Holden and his bank enabled
 
him to become a Liberal free trader. In 1920s the Midland Bank accumulated bad debts mainly due
 
to the slump of the Lancashire cotton industry and the South Wales coal and steel industry.??
Accordingly,it is also possible to say that McKenna’s view reflected his concern about the condition
 
of export industries.
We can add the name of J.A.Hobson to the list of tough-minded opponents to return to gold. In
 
the article in the Nation (in the US), he supported Keynes and stated:‘experience and statistical
 
research have made it evident that the old notion that quantity of gold regulated the total volume of
 
money and so the level of prices, by a reliable automatic operation,was never true, and that the
 
acceptance of the falsehood was responsible for grave errors in banking policy reflected in needless
 
fluctuations of prices and industrial activity.’??
Thus, Hobson’s stance was certainly coherent from the pre-war years in that he defended
 
producer’s interests against rentier’s interests.
As for the mass media,there were the opponents such as pro-Conservative the National Review
 
edited by Maxse,St Loe Strachey’s the Spectator,pro-Labour the New Statesman,and pro-Liberal
 
the Nation and the Athenaeum edited by Hubert Henderson. Besides, as a press baron Lord
 
Beaverbrook,who had been one of the main Conservative engineers of the Coalition,was another
 
opponent to return to gold.??
However opposition to return to gold was very feeble as a whole. As a result,Conservative
 
Chancellor Churchill,ex-Liberal radical,reached the final decision after a long hesitation. In the
 
parliamentary debate Sir Alfred Mond,a Liberal industrialist,was the only outright opponent to the
 
decision.??? From this situation,we can say that the opposition to return to gold was marginalised
 
not only among the Conservatives but among the Liberals. As long as the Conservatives were ruled
 
by gentlemanly elites as I have argued,their stance is understandable. But how should we interpret
 
the stance of the Liberals?
As regards this question,we can approach it from three aspects. First, there were rightwing
 
Liberals led by Sir John Simon,successors of the Liberal Imperialists.??? Since the pre-war years they
??Cain and Hopkins,op.cit.,p.140.
??A.R.Holmes and Edwin Green,Midland : 150 years of banking business,London,1986,pp.95-96.
??Ibid.,pp.83,108.
??Ibid.,p.174.
??The Nation,April 29,1925,p.488.
??Boyce,op.cit.,pp.63,73-74.
???Ibid.,op.cit.,p.77.
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 were generally antipathetic to the radical policies. Accordingly they tended to be loyal to economic
 
orthodoxy,so naturally they welcomed return to gold. But of course this explanation does not cover
 
the attitude of the majority of other Liberals.
Second,originally the attitude of industries was ambivalent. While return to gold at the pre-war
 
par was expected to have a deflationary impact on export industries,stabilisation of the exchange rate
 
and import of cheaper raw material were expected to have a good effect on those industries. For
 
example,the cotton industry is, if anything,regarded as having been favourable to return to gold.
The F.B.I.never attacked the decision severely either. Arguably this ambivalence of export industries
 
was reflected by Lloyd George’s stance. He kept silent through the debate at the House except for
 
one question,‘One thing I was going to ask was as to the effect in the view of the Board of Trade of
 
the restoration of the gold standard upon our export trade,and the prices paid for foreign invest-
ments.’ The answer by P.Cunliffe-Lister,President of the Board of Trade,was,‘I should say at once
 
that it had been all to the good.’???
When it became clear that the deflationary impact upon export industries was serious,Lloyd
 
George began to attack the government and his former partner,Churchill. Lloyd George shouted at
 
the address in July 1925, when two months had passed since return to gold:‘the action of the
 
Government which has had the most disastrous effect upon British trade is their premature and
 
precipitate restoration of the gold standard before our credit was ripe for that departure. It has made
 
the sterling dearer,and thus artificially put up the price of British goods in the neutral markets where
 
we were already competing on very narrow margins with our trade rivals. At this very hour
 
coalowners and miners have been driven to the brink of a yawning chasm of strife,largely through
 
this deed of egregious recklessness by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.’???
However it remains unknown to what extent this Lloyd George’s campaign was supported among
 
the Liberals. The report of the Liberal Industrial Inquiry in 1928,the Yellow Book,mentioned that
 
they failed to reach an agreement on the effect of return to gold.???
Now it is necessary to take the third approach. As I have already mentioned, the Liberals
 
basically considered that the prosperity of the financial sector could fully coexist with industrial
 
interests. Accordingly they consistently pursued harmonization of both elements rather than prior-
itising one element over another element one-sidedly. Probably the disagreement on the effect of
 
return to gold reflected such a character of the Liberals. But if that coexistence proved to be difficult
???Though Simon himself belonged to the group of the old Gladstonean rather than the Liberal Imperialists in the
 
pre-war years.
???Parliamentary Debates (Commons),5?ser.,vol.186,col.83.
???Liberal Magazine,August,1925,p.477.
???Liberal Industrial Inquiry,Britain’s Industrial Future,London,1928,pp.410-411.
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 to maintain, the Liberals, or at least the centrist and left Liberals, tried to restore the coexistence
 
through aggressive regulation. In this regard,the stance of the Liberals was largely different from
 
laissez faire of the Conservatives. And this stance of the Liberals could attract the City Liberals or
 
the City progressives such as Walter Layton,R.H.Brand,Hugh Bell,Thomas Jacobsen,Sir Josiah
 
Stamp and Sir Arthur Salter,although they were a minority in the City.??? The City Liberals seem
 
to have believed that the regulation of the activity of the City would be beneficial to the City too in
 
the longer term even if it might damage the City’s interests in the shorter term. Next,I will take up
 
the Liberal industrial strategy aiming to reach that goal.
The forrunner of the new industrial strategy by the Liberals was Coal and Power published in 1924.
In this book,the enquiry chaired by Lloyd George recommended the compulsory organisation of the
 
coal industry through the nationalisation of royalties. Lloyd George’s preface made clear that the
 
proposal aimed to prevent the deterioration of relation between capital and labour.???
In 1926 Asquith retired and was replaced by Lloyd George as leader of the Liberals. In the same
 
year Lloyd George organised the Liberal Industrial Inquiry. Leading figures of the Executive
 
Committee which consisted of thirteen members were newly recruited Liberals after the war such as
 
Layton (chairman),Ernest Simon (vice-chairman),Keynes,Hubert Henderson,and Ramsay Muir.
But the committee also included several leading and longstanding Liberal radicals such as C.F.G.
Masterman (though he died before the publication of the Report), Sir Herbert Samuel, B. S.
Rowntree, and Lloyd George. Therefore, to a certain extent it is possible to find a continuing
 
element from the pre-war years in the activity of the Inquiry. In addition,Philip Kerr(later Lord
 
Lothian),who had been a member of the‘Milner Kindergarten’thereafter had been a Lloyd George’
s secretary,joined the Executive Committee. The Special Committees of the Inquiry included R.H.
Brand,Josiah Stamp,Laurence Cadbury,T.J.Macnamara,D.H.Robertson,and L.T.Hobhouse who
 
had been one of the representative ideologues of the Liberal radicals in the pre-war years.??? On the
 
other hand,Sir John Simon,a member of the Executive Committee,declined to sign the final report.???
The Inquiry published the final report,Britain’s Industrial Future,or the Yellow Book in 1928
 
after much research. The Yellow Book consists of five parts, Book I, ‘the Condition of British
???According to Howe,Jacobsen was‘a nice reminder of the City’s own industrial interests’. Howe,‘The Liberals and
 
the City’. As a witness for the Cunliffe Committee,Bell also gave the pro-industry evidence. Minutes of evidence
 
for Cunliffe Committee,pp.559-569. T/185/1,at the PRO.
???Lloyd George Enquiry,Coal and Power,London,1924.
???M.Freeden,The New Liberalism,Oxford,1978,passim.
???Lord Samuel,Memoirs,London,1945,p.
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 Industry’,Book II,‘the Organisation of Business’,Book III,‘Industrial Relations’,Book IV,‘National
 
Development’,and Book V,‘National Finance’. As a whole,the Inquiry aims to restore traditional
 
key industries at depression through drastic structural reform:First,the formation of capital-labour-
cooperation through the corporatistic state intervention. Second,the large-scale public investments
 
financed by government loan. Third,the control of foreign investments into domestic investments.
Thus,the Inquiry aimed to revise Britain’s industrial structure,which was excessively dependent on
 
foreign markets,through control of investments.???
According to Michael Freeden,the Yellow Book became the‘Bible’for the Liberals.??? Keynes’
s influence is obvious especially about the plan of the public investment. But we should not
 
overestimate the personal influence of Keynes. According to Roy Harrod,‘Keynes was primarily
 
responsible for the composition of Book II and of Book V,chapters 18 and 19’.??? That is to say,
the part of‘National Development’,which deals with the public works for the unemployed,was not
 
attributable to the idea of Keynes alone. The argument especially in ‘National Development’was
 
deepened and developed into the Liberal electoral programme,We Can Conquer Unemployment,or
 
the Orange Book in 1929, which proposed the large-scale public works financed by government
 
deficits.??? The Orange Book was made by the committee led by Lloyd George,Rowntree,and Kerr.
But the draft was written by R.Wallace,Rowntree’s secretary.???
In the meantime,the Independent Labour Party made their own programme,the Living Wage,
which was based on Hobson’s underconsumptionist theory, to resolve the industrial depression.
While the Liberal programme emphasised demands for domestic investment, the ILP programme
 
emphasised demands for domestic consumption. As a result, the authors of the Living Wage
 
concentrated upon raising wages through state intervention. Besides they proposed control of
 
investments similar to the Liberal plan. But they were more radical than the Liberals in that they
 
proposed nationalisation of the Bank of England.??? Although in many respects this programme was
 
different from the Liberal programme,both programmes pursued Britain’s industrial revival through
 
state intervention which had a basically non-socialistic character. In fact, four co-authors of the
 
Living Wage included representative pro-Liberal Hobson and H.N.Brailsford who had been one of
 
the editorial staff of the Nation in the pre-war years.??? Later the ILP would struggle jointly with the
 
Liberals in demanding an aggressive financial policy from the Labour Government.
???Liberal Industrial Inquiry,op.cit.
???Freeden,Liberalism Divided,p.
???R.Harrod,The Life of John Maynard Keynes,London,1951,p.393.
???Liberal Party,We Can Conquer Unemployment,London,1929.
???C.Cook,A Short History of the Liberal Party,London,1976,p.108.;A.Briggs,A Study of the Work of Seebohm
 
Rowntree,London,1961,pp.207-208.
???H.N.Brailsford,et al.,The Living Wage,London,1926,p.18.
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 Yet it should be noted that the Liberals were still moderate in comparison with the ILP. As
 
Howe aptly says,‘the Liberals at their most radical proposed no dramatic structural alterations to the
 
City of London and its part in the economy’. That is,‘only minor changes were envisaged to the
 
constitution of the Bank of England,stopping well short of nationalisation.’??? And in turn the City
 
Liberals such as Layton,Salter,and Stamp pushed for the international monetary reform to stabilise
 
prices side by side with the Liberal industrial strategy,but to no avail.??? In that point,generally the
 
City Liberals who were free traders tended to be more radical than the City Conservatives who
 
occasionally supported protectionism,for the latter seemed to be indifferent to both the aggressive
 
industrial strategy and the international monetary reform.
The Conservative Party’s reaction to the Liberal plan was also cool,except for a handful of the
 
Young Tories led by Harold Macmillan who published Industry and the State in 1927. Baldwin’
s remark at the parliamentary debate in which the Liberal Yellow Book was disputed is as follows:
‘There is an encouraging aspect when you consider,along with the one in ten out of work,the present
 
day lot of the nine out of ten who are in work. The standard of life is appreciably better than it was
 
in 1914.’‘If we want to maintain the standard of life which we have,with infinite difficulty,achieved
 
in this country,first of all we want to be relieved from losses caused by disputes.‥‥Another way in
 
which we may maintain our standard of living is by attaining a higher level of efficiency in our
 
industries,by examining our industrial organization,bringing it up to date in method,in machinery
 
and in management. I rejoice to see the symptoms in this country in many industries to-day that these
 
are the very things that are being looked into and looked into on all sides.’???
Thus, Baldwin emphasised cheerful aspects of the economy and practically contradicted the
 
necessity for the aggressive state intervention. Moreover,anomalously the Baldwin government made
 
the Treasury announce‘the Treasury View’practically attacking the Liberal programme.
Robert Boyce argues in his distinguished book mainly covering 1920s that industrial interests
 
represented by the imperialist and nationalist camp or the protectionist camp fought against financial
 
interests represented by the internationalist camp or the free trader camp. As long as there were some
 
die-hard protectionists such as Maxse, Garvin, and Beaverbrook, and as long as there were some
 
libertarian free traders such as F.W.Hirst and Cecils, it is not possible to contradict that view
 
completely. However Boyce seems to overlook the general tendency in which protectionist policy
 
was used as an opportunistic expediency and the Liberal free traders were more earnest about the
???Before the 1929 General Election,Hobson already supported the proposal to cure unemployment by public works
 
financed by State loans. See Nation and the Athenaeum,March 30,1929,pp.903-904.
???Howe,‘The Liberals and the City’.
???Boyce,op.cit.,pp.166-174.
???Parliamentary Debates (Commons),5?ser.,vol.213,cols.608,610-611.
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 resolution of industrial problems,though he himself indicates such tendencies in his book in several
 
points as I have cited.
In this respect, Cain and Hopkins are persuasive in their argument on the introduction of
 
protectionism and imperial preference since 1932.??? As they insist,the transformation of economic
 
policy since 1932 should be interpreted from the standpoint of financial interests rather than industrial
 
interests,for it is difficult to presume that the character of the Conservatives drastically changed in
 
a very short time.
On the other hand,it should be also taken into account that the strategy of the Liberals had a
 
serious contradiction. As long as they stuck to free trade,raising domestic demand would cause a
 
deterioration of balance of payments. In other words,the economic nationalist strategy concentrat-
ing on the home market inevitably contradicted the internationalist free trade policy at least under the
 
fixed exchange rate. As a result, the Liberals lost some important members such as Keynes and
 
Ernest Simon.??? Therefore the Liberals’die-hard loyalty to free trade cannot be explained from the
 
standpoint of economic interests alone. Rather,as Trentmann and Howe indicate,ideological factors
 
should be emphasised. But the logical contradiction does not necessarily mean that the Liberals’
intention was not serious.
Then,is it possible to insist that the Liberal industrial strategy in 1920s was solely due to Lloyd
 
George’s unique leadership? Mainly for two reasons I can argue against this view. First,originally
 
the movement towards the new industrial strategy was generated by the Asquithian Liberals before the
 
reunion of the Liberals. Second,after Lloyd George had become the Independent Liberal in 1931,
many remaining Liberals participated in the Next Five Years group,who proposed an aggressive
 
industrial policy and management of banking and finance similar to the Yellow Book.??? It is true
 
that the group called themselves nonpartisan, and in fact one of the core members was Harold
 
Macmillan. However, as Freeden indicates, the Liberal tendency of the group was obvious as a
 
whole. Geoffrey Crowther and Salter, both Liberals,were responsible for the first section of the
 
book dealing with domestic affairs.??? The signatories included Layton,Rowntree,Cadbury,Isaac
 
Foot,H.A.L.Fisher,Gilbert Murray,J.L.Hammond,and Hobson,other than several Liberal MPs.
Therefore,it is difficult to accept the above assumption.
???Cain and Hopkins,op.cit.,pp.464-470.
???On the other hand,the conversion of the rightwing Liberals led by John Simon to protectionism is another evidence
 
for my thesis that protectionism was always an expediency rather than a means to collectivism.
???The Next Five Years: An Essay in Political Agreement,London,1935,part I.
???Freeden,Liberalism Divided,pp.356-360.
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?
As I have argued, there was clearly a general tendency that the Liberal free traders were more
 
collectivistic and more earnest supporter of industrial interests than the Conservative tariff reformers.
Of course,both the Liberals and the Conservatives were not unanimous at any time. However the
 
most important point is that within the Liberals collectivistic elements who championed industrial
 
interests continued to have the initiative over economic policy. Conversely,within the Conservatives
 
collectivistic elements who championed industrial interests continued to be marginalised. Green,
who emphasises collectivistic elements within the Conservatives,himself indicates that even Arthur
 
Steel-Maitland,a quite moderate collectivist,ended his political life as‘a disappointed man’.??? On
 
this point, Matthew Fforde is very persuasive in his argument that the essential character of the
 
Conservatives in the Edwardian age was‘non-interventionist party’.???
Then,what caused such a paradoxical situation? Presumably the most important factor is that
 
the British protectionism in those days was always the ideology of the right,not the left. One main
 
reason of this is that the protectionism was always connected to the imperialism. Another main
 
reason is that tariffs have the effect as regressive taxes. So far as the Conservatives’identity was in
 
maintaining the existing class order,the Conservative tariff reformers could never overcome the rule
 
by gentlemanly elites. And so far as protectionism was held by the Conservatives,they could never
 
overcome the people’s natural suspicion that tariffs were mere expediency to decrease the tax burden
 
on the propertied. In that sense,protectionism could have succeeded,only if it had been held by the
 
Liberals, the party of the left. But the Liberals never adopted protectionism. As a result, the
 
political left was monopolised by the free trade ideology.??? In turn,the Liberals’as well as Labour’
s loyalty to free trade cannot be explained by economic interests alone,and should be considered from
 
the viewpoint of the political culture too.
As for the theory of the gentlemanly capitalism by Cain and Hopkins,my argument is unfavoura-
ble concerning the Edwardian age,but is favourable concerning the inter-war years. But concerning
 
the Edwardian age too,there might remain room for Cain and Hopkins to argue that their theory does
 
not necessarily fail,as the Liberal Government did not attack the function of the financial sector per
 
se. However, as Green aptly argues, the issues at stake are‘how far this［the rapid growth of
???E.H.H.Green,Ideologies of Conservatism,Oxford,2002,p.72. Green argues that libertarian elements within the
 
Conservatives were drawn from the Liberals on the ground that Conservative libertarians such as A.V.Dicey and St.
Loe Strachey were ex-Liberals. Do., The Crisis, pp.316-317. But it is also possible to argue that collectivistic
 
elements within the Conservatives were drawn from the Liberals on the ground that Conservative collectivists such as
 
Joseph Chamberlain and Milner were ex-Liberals.
???M.Fforde,Conservatism and Collectivism 1886-1914,Edinburgh,1990,passim.
???After the decolonization,British protectionism was divorced from imperialism at last. It was not until 1970s that
 
British left adopted protectionism.
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 Britain’s service sector economy］ was traceable to the influence of Britain’s service sector elite in the
 
corridors of power.’??? Accordingly,if they regard economic policy as a mere expression of interest
 
of the dominant economic sector,it is nothing other than the crude economic determinism that they
 
themselves criticise. Nevertheless it should be admitted that the theory of the gentlemanly capitalism
 
is successful as a whole in interpreting the modern British history,for the modern British history from
 
1886 to 1997 was entirely characterised by the unique dominance of the Conservatives.
※ In this paper,I did not mention the Liberal agricultural policies at all. But,as Ian Packer argues,
the Liberal land campaign was a significant part of the Liberal domestic policies. If the Tariff
 
Reform movement was Sammlungspolitik in the British version, the Liberals unfolded counter-
Sammlungspolitik in the Edwardian age,and the Land Campaign by Lloyd George was an indispens-
able part of this counter-Sammlungspolitik. The Land and the Nation,or the Green Book,in 1925
 
was the successor of it.
???E.H.H.Green,‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Economic Policy,1880-1914’, in R.Dumett,ed., Gentlemanly
 
Capitalism and British Imperialism,London,1999,p.66.
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